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JUDICIAL EQUITY: AN ARGUMENT FOR
POST-ACQUITTAL RETRIAL WHEN THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS IS FUNDAMENTALLY
DEFECTIVE
Thomas M. DiBiagio*
The federal criminal system is a functional institution that affords a de-
fendant extensive judicial review of the process that resulted in his con-
viction. Direct review after a conviction is undertaken by the district
court pursuant to a motion for a new trial, and by the circuit court on
appeal. In addition, collateral review is provided for after the conviction
is affirmed through post-conviction proceedings.
In undertaking direct review, the courts have never been reluctant to
upset a judgment of conviction that is the product of an error of law by
the district court or misconduct by the prosecutor.' When a conviction is
* Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Maryland. The views and
opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect those of
the Department of Justice. The author wishes to thank Christine Manuelian for her edito-
rial assistance.
1. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 265, 272 (1958) (reversing a conviction based
upon the prosecution's failure to cure a witness's misleading testimony that the prosecution
knew to be false); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1957) (reversing a conviction based
upon the prosecution's solicitation of misleading testimony); United States v. Tomlinson,
67 F.3d 508, 514 (4th Cir. 1995) (enbanc) (reversing a conviction based on the district
court's failure to give instruction on a scienter requirement); United States v. Torres, 65
F.3d 1241, 1248 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing judgment on grounds that the conviction was
obtained by the use of illegally seized evidence); United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933, 934
(4th Cir. 1995) (reversing a conviction based on the district court's improper Allen charge);
United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 35 (4th Cir. 1995) (reversing a conviction based on the
district court's failure to give complete jury instruction on conspiracy law); United States v.
Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1293-94 (4th Cir. 1995) (remanding a case because the district court
failed to conduct a competency hearing); United States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 511 (4th Cir.
1995) (reversing a conviction based on the district court's erroneous evidentiary ruling);
United States v. Floresca, 38 F.3d 706, 714 (4th Cir. 1994) (reversing a conviction based on
the district court's constructive amendment of the indictment); United States v. Kelly, 35
F.3d 929, 938 (4th Cir. 1994) (reversing a conviction based on the prosecution's failure to
disclose material evidence affecting credibility of government witness); United States v.
Solivan, 937 F.2d 1146, 1150 (6th Cir. 1991) (reversing a defendant's conviction after find-
ing the prosecution's misstep "so destructive" as to constitute reversible error); United
States v. Boyd, 833 F. Supp. 1277, 1366 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (granting a new trial after a convic-
tion based on prosecutorial misconduct). But see United States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81 (2d
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infected by error or misconduct the judgment is vacated and the defend-
ant is retried. A reversal and the resultant burden of a second trial is
accepted because the legitimacy and integrity of the justice system is de-
pendent on a criminal process that results in respectable judgments.
However, there is no symmetry in the criminal process.
Unlike a conviction, the criminal process tolerates and accepts an ac-
quittal that not only is infected by error, but is the product of plain error
of law by a district court, jury and witness intimidation or tampering, or
misconduct by defense counsel.
A defendant has no right to benefit from an acquittal obtained through
a judicial process that is defective in some fundamental respect. Judicial
review and retrial after an acquittal should be permitted when the judg-
ment of acquittal calls into question the legitimacy and integrity of the
criminal process. This clearly occurs when the acquittal is the product of
plain error by the district court, jury and witness intimidation or tamper-
ing, or misconduct by defense counsel. Unfortunately, the prosecution is
not permitted to seek judicial review and retry a defendant in order to
nullify plain error, intimidation, tampering, or misconduct. The reason
articulated for the absolute preclusion against judicial review and retrial
after an acquittal is the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.2
Although the express language of the Double Jeopardy Clause does
not preclude judicial review and retrial after an acquittal, the Supreme
Court has held that the scope of the intended protection unequivocally
prohibits the prosecution from seeking to set aside a judgment of acquit-
tal and retrying an accused.3 This absolute preclusion holds true even
when the judgment of acquittal was obtained through a judicial process
that was defective in some fundamental respect.4 The reason for the ab-
solute preclusion of a retrial after an acquittal is grounded in terms of
fundamental fairness.5 The central assumption is that a second prosecu-
tion after an acquittal is unduly burdensome and prejudicial to the ac-
Cir. 1982) (finding a prosecutor's improper comment erroneous, but without decision alter-
ing impact due to the overwhelming amount of evidence presented at trial).
2. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any person be sub-
ject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
3. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978); Green v. United States, 355
U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
4. See Washington, 434 U.S. at 503; United States v. Ham, 58 F.3d 78, 82 (4th Cir.
1995).
5. See Washington, 434 U.S. at 503 ("[I]f the innocence of the accused has been con-
firmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial
would be unfair.").
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cused because of increased financial and emotional strain on him and
because the prosecution is provided with a more favorable opportunity to
secure a conviction. 6
The clear mandate of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to preclude the
government from abusing the power of prosecution by making repeated
attempts to convict or punish an accused. Despite this premise, the crimi-
nal process must also be structured to afford the public, through the pros-
ecution, a fair opportunity to enforce its criminal laws. An acquittal that
is the product of a clear and obvious error of law by the district court,
witness intimidation or tampering, or misconduct by defense counsel, de-
nies the prosecution a fair opportunity to present the case and the public
a fair opportunity to enforce its criminal laws.
There are three reasons for permitting limited judicial review and re-
trial in the event of a faulty judgment of acquittal. First, permitting lim-
ited judicial review and retrial does not undermine the protection
provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Second, the rationale behind
double jeopardy protection yields to judicial review and retrial in less
compelling circumstances. Third, permitting review of a judgment of ac-
quittal that is the product of plain error by the district court, witness in-
timidation or tampering, or misconduct, promotes the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system.
Although preclusion of a retrial after an acquittal is considered a mat-
ter of unassailable doctrine, it is time that the Supreme Court reconsider
the absolute preclusion of judicial review after an acquittal when the
judgment is fundamentally defective. A criminal process that is wrought
with plain error of law, jury and witness intimidation or tampering, or
misconduct by defense counsel, is defective in a fundamental respect.
The Supreme Court should acknowledge these flaws and issue a strong
decision permitting the government to seek judicial review.
I. CONTAMINATED JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
Imagine the following scenario. Seven defendants, all former city po-
lice officers, are indicted by the federal grand jury and charged with con-
spiracy, extortion, obstruction of justice, and civil rights violations arising
out of more than thirty state narcotics prosecutions over a period of five
years. During trial, the prosecution presents evidence establishing that
during the time charged in the indictment, the officers extorted money
from drug dealers, used excessive force, fabricated evidence, and lied
6. See Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88.
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under oath to win convictions in state court.7 At the conclusion of the
trial, counsel for the defendants make lengthy closing arguments. In im-
passioned pleas, counsel air improper and highly prejudicial statements
before the jury. More particularly, counsel refer to facts not in evidence
and personally vouch for the credibility of their witnesses. Counsel fur-
ther remark that they are all former Assistant United States Attorneys
and have devoted much of their professional careers to prosecuting
criminals. They state that while they firmly believe that criminals should
be convicted, their clients are innocent. The prosecution repeatedly ob-
jects and requests a mistrial. The district court refuses to find manifest
necessity, and therefore, denies the motion for a mistrial.8 The trial court
finds that a curative instruction is sufficient to remedy any prejudice. The
district court then proceeds to instruct the jury that they are to decide the
case based on the evidence before them and that argument of counsel is
not evidence. After three hours of deliberation, the jury acquits all de-
fendants. Later, the prosecution learns that one of the jurors voted for an
acquittal because her family was threatened by one of the defendants.
The government cannot appeal the acquittals. The defendants have es-
caped responsibility for their conduct and counsel have benefitted from
their outrageous conduct.
A second example, although apparently benign, is equally demonstra-
tive. A criminal trial in district court, charging the defendant with bank-
ruptcy fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152, has concluded. Counsel for
the government and the defendant meet in chambers to discuss the jury
instructions. The district court rules that the Supreme Court's decision in
Ratzlaf v. United States9 requires that the prosecution prove that the de-
7. See generally George James, Corrupt Officer Draws 5 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1995, at B6 (describing instances of misconduct by New York City Police officers); George
James, Officer Draws Jail Sentence for Perjury, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1995, at B3 (same).
8. See United States v. Shaw, 829 F.2d 714, 720 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that defense
counsel's opening remarks that potentially provoked juror bias created manifest necessity
to declare a mistrial).
Typically, the prosecution is extremely reluctant to move for a mistrial at a late stage of a
trial. First, considering the time, expense, and burden on the witnesses, the prosecution is
generally inclined not to abort the trial at such a late stage of the proceedings. Second, an
erroneous mistrial ruling may be found to preclude a retrial. A retrial, after a mistrial is
declared without the defendant's consent, runs the risk of being barred by double jeop-
ardy. See United States v. Sloan, 36 F.3d 386, 393 (4th Cir. 1994) ("When a mistrial is
declared over a criminal defendant's objection, retrial is permitted only when 'there is a
manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated."'
(quoting United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824))).
9. 510 U.S. 135 (1994). In Ratzlaf, the Court held that to convict a defendant of
willfully violating 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3), prohibiting the structuring of currency
transactions, the government had to establish that the defendant knew that his conduct was
unlawful. See id. at 149.
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fendant knew that his conduct was a crime.10 The prosecution is now in
jeopardy. The government, not having anticipated that the district court
would radically alter its burden of proof by reading an additional element
into the statute, has not offered any evidence that the defendant knew
that his conduct was a crime. The defendant had not even argued such a
proposition at the close of the government's case in connection with his
motion for judgment of acquittal.
The government objects to the instruction. The court quickly denies
the government's objection and proceeds to instruct the jury that the gov-
ernment must prove and the jury must find that the defendant acted vol-
untarily and with criminal intent. Counsel for the defendant seizes on
this instruction and effectively argues that the government has failed to
offer evidence of all the elements of the offense. Because there is no
evidence that the defendant knew that his conduct was a crime, the jury
acquits the defendant.
The district court has committed an egregious error of law." The re-
sulting judgment of acquittal is unquestionably the product of plain error
of law. Nevertheless, the government cannot appeal the acquittal and the
defendant avoids all responsibility for his conduct.
II. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
A. General Principles
The government is precluded from seeking judicial review and retrying
an accused after an acquittal. This absolute preclusion, a creation of the
courts, is drawn from the prohibition against successive prosecutions set
forth in the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Con-
stitution. The deliberately general text of the twenty words that make up
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not expressly preclude the prosecution
from appealing a judgment of acquittal and retrying a defendant. At the
time the Fifth Amendment was adopted, there was no judicial review af-
ter a judgment in a criminal case.' 2 The judgment of conviction or acquit-
10. The district court's ruling is incorrect, for the standard announced in Ratzlaf is
clearly not the law for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 152. See United States v. Zehrbach, 47
F.3d 1252, 1261 (3rd Cir.) (holding that "proof of knowledge of illegality is not a burden of
the government in a bankruptcy fraud case"), cert. denied sub nom. Mervis v. United
States, 115 S. Ct. 1699 (1995); cf United States v. Daughtry, 48 F.3d 829, 832 (4th Cir.
1995) (concluding that the term "willfully" in a false statement statute does not require
proof that the defendant knowingly violated the law).
11. For a discussion of why the district court's instruction is incorrect, see supra note
10.
12. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87-88 (1978) (relating the history of the
Double Jeopardy Clause).
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tal ended the matter with no retrials.' 3 As a result, the full scope of the
protection is more learned by the courts than innate.
With the advent and development of judicial review in criminal cases,
courts began to define the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The courts have fashioned the absolute preclusion against appeal after an
acquittal to further the intent behind the Double Jeopardy Clause as a
safeguard against government tyranny. Because the intent and product
of judicial review after an acquittal would be to upset the acquittal and
retry a defendant, the courts have barred judicial review in such cases.
As a consequence, any reconsideration of the absolute preclusion against
judicial review and retrial after an acquittal must be framed by the intent
behind double jeopardy protection.14 If a limited appeal after an acquit-
tal does not offend the intent of that protection, then absolute preclusion
is not well founded.
Review of a judgment of acquittal, under limited circumstances where
the integrity of the criminal process is in question, would enhance the role
and function of the courts as the guardian of individual rights. Any con-
cern that an accused's rights will be sacrificed by permitting judicial re-
view fails to consider that courts are neither cautious nor compliant when
ensuring that the criminal process is fundamentally fair to the accused.1 5
The courts will continue to view the law not as a fixed rule, but as a set of
values assigned to ensure a fundamentally fair criminal process for the
accused. Certainly, any review would consider both the merits and the
fairness of a second prosecution. 6 One point is clear: judicial review
would obviate any attempt by the prosecution to abuse its power.
13. See id. at 88.
14. See James F. Ponsoldt, When Guilt Should Be Irrelevant: Government Overreach-
ing as a Bar to Reprosecution Under the Double Jeopardy Cause After Oregon v. Kennedy,
69 CORNELL L. REV. 76, 81 (1983) (arguing that the intent behind the Double Jeopardy
Clause is to prevent the government from gaining an unfair advantage in a second trial in
which the reliability of the jury's determination would be decreased).
15. See, e.g., supra note 1; see also Philadelphia Feels Effects of Injury, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 1996, at 35 (indicating that numerous convictions have been set aside because
investigating officers lied, tampered with evidence, and conducted illegal searches).
16. A retrial may be subject to a motion to dismiss on the grounds of selective or
vindictive prosecution. See United States v. Montoya, 45 F.3d 1286, 1299 (9th Cir.) ("'To
establish a prima facie case of prosecutorial vindictiveness, a defendant must show either
direct evidence of actual vindictiveness or facts that warrant an appearance of such."'
(quoting United States v. Sinigaglio, 942 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1991))), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 67 (1995); United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1432 (9th Cir. 1994) (setting forth the
elements of a selective prosecution claim), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1147 (1995); see also
United States v. Williams, 47 F.3d 658, 660 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the prosecution
cannot seek a more severe punishment upon retrial as a method of retaliation against the
defendant).
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B. Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has read double jeopardy protection as an une-
quivocal prohibition against appeal and retrial, even if the acquittal is
"'based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation."' 17 Despite the
Supreme Court's position, a number of cases call into question the con-
tinued validity of absolute preclusion.
In United States v. Sanges,' s the Supreme Court held that the prosecu-
tion did not have a right to appeal an acquittal in a criminal case absent
an express grant of authority by the legislature. 19 The Court did not hold
that the Constitution precluded judicial review and retrial after an acquit-
tal; rather, the Court found that the "rule" against successive prosecu-
tions was of such "vital importance" it could not yield to judicial review
and retrial after an acquittal absent "express words" in the statute.2" The
Court relied on a statement from the Supreme Court of Tennessee, ex-
plaining that the common law prohibits an individual from being tried
twice for the same offense, with all procedural errors favoring the defend-
ant rather than harming him.2 The importance of this rule in maintain-
ing personal safety from government interference was such that any
exception to double jeopardy could only be by express words.22
In United States v. Ball,23 the Court went further than Sanges and held
that the Constitution precludes retrial after an acquittal.24 In Ball, after
three defendants were indicted and charged with murder,25 two were con-
victed and the third was acquitted.26 On appeal, the Court reversed the
convictions because the initial indictment was defective. 27 All three de-
17. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) (quoting Fong Foo v. United
States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962)); see also United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 289 (1970)
(precluding an appeal by the prosecution from an acquittal even when the legal theory
underlying the judgment was erroneous), superseded by statute as stated in United States v.
Jones, 542 F.2d 661, 673 (6th Cir. 1976).
18. 144 U.S. 310 (1892).
19. See id. at 318. The court stated:
[A]s generally understood and administered in the United States, and in the ab-
sence of any statute expressly giving the right to the State, a writ of error cannot
be sued out in a criminal case after a final judgment in favor of the defendant,
whether that judgment has been rendered upon a verdict of acquittal, or upon a
determination by the court of an issue of law.
Id.
20. Id. at 313.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
24. See id. at 671.
25. See id. at 663.
26. See id. at 664.
27. See id. at 664-65.
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fendants were then reindicted, retried, and found guilty.28 On appeal, the
Court determined that the initial acquittal barred the subsequent prose-
cution of the acquitted defendant.29 The Court found that a review of the
acquittal would violate the Constitution by placing the defendant in
double jeopardy, regardless of the reason for the review. 30 The Court
permitted, however, retrials of the other two defendants because the pre-
vious indictment upon which they were convicted was set aside.3'
Eight years later, in a compelling dissenting opinion, Justice Holmes
took exception to Ball.32 In Kepner v. United States,33 the defendant was
acquitted of an embezzling charge following a nonjury trial in a Philip-
pine Islands court.34 The United States government took an appeal to
the Supreme Court of the Philippines, which reversed the trial court and
found the defendant guilty.35 Because the Philippines was a United
States territory, appeal was granted to the United States Supreme
Court.36 Relying on Ball, the Court reversed, holding that the defendant
had been exposed to a second trial in violation of the constitutional
protection.37
Justice Holmes dissented and argued that the majority's opinion was
legally dubious and established damaging precedent. 38 In a withering re-
buke, he wrote that an appeal and retrial were permitted whether the
defendant was acquitted or convicted because the protection against suc-
cessive prosecutions did not attach until the proceeding was final.39
Justice Holmes reasoned that a trial and retrial constituted one proce-
dure, entailing one continuous jeopardy, and that no second jeopardy en-
sued until a conviction or acquittal, free from legal error, had been
obtained.4" Recognizing the value that symmetry would bring to the
criminal process, Justice Holmes argued that proceedings did not become
final until appeals by both the prosecution and the defendant were ex-
28. See id at 665-66.
29. See id at 671.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 672.
32. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
33. 195 U.S. 100 (1904).
34. See id. at 110.
35. See id. at 110-11.
36. See id. at 116-20 (discussing the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the Philippine
Islands as granted through congressional enactment).
37. See id. at 133-34.
38. See id. at 134 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justices White and McKenna joined Justice
Holmes in dissent. See id.
39. See id. at 135-37.
40. See id.
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hausted.41 Justice Holmes argued that a second trial was merely "a con-
tinuation of the jeopardy" beginning with the original prosecution.42
Justice Holmes did not dispute that double jeopardy protection forbids
retrial after acquittal;43 nor did he, however, find this preclusion to be
absolute. Justice Holmes argued that the first jeopardy should be treated
as continuing until both sides had exhausted their appeals on claimed er-
rors of law, regardless of the possibility that the defendant may be sub-
jected to retrial."
Thirty-three years after Kepner, the Supreme Court in Palko v. Con-
necticut45 held that a state prosecutor could appeal an acquittal and retry
the defendant without violating any "'fundamental principles of liberty
and justice."' 46 The Court reasoned that the state's interest in obtaining a
trial "free from the corrosion of substantial legal error" was sufficient to
permit an appeal and retrial.47 In Palko, the State of Connecticut in-
41. See id. at 135-36.
42. Id. at 137. Justice Holmes asserted that because the prosecution was not final until
review by the appellate court was exhausted, the double jeopardy protection did not pre-
clude judicial review and retrial after an acquittal. See id. at 135-37.
43. See id. at 134.
44. See id. at 135. Justice Holmes wrote that:
The case is of great importance.., because the decision necessarily will carry with
it an interpretation of the [Constitution] .... [W]e shall have fastened upon the
country a doctrine covering the whole criminal law, which, it seems to me, will
have serious and evil consequences. At the present time in this country there is
more danger that criminals will escape justice than that they will be subjected to
tyranny. But I do not stop to consider or to state the consequences in detail, as
such considerations are not supposed to be entertained by judges .... It is more
pertinent to observe that ... logically and rationally a man cannot be said to be
more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may be tried. The
jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning to the end of the cause.
Everybody agrees that the principle in its origin was a rule forbidding a trial in a
new and independent case where a man already had been tried once. But there is
no rule that a man may not be tried twice in the same case. It has been decided by
this court that he may be tried a second time, even for his life, if the jury disagree,
or notwithstanding their agreement and verdict, if the verdict is set aside on the
prisoner's exceptions for error in the trial. He even may be tried on a new indict-
ment if the judgment on the first is arrested upon motion ....
If a statute should give the right to take exceptions to the Government, I be-
lieve it would be impossible to maintain that the prisoner would be protected by
the Constitution from being tried again. He no more would be put in jeopardy a
second time when retried because of a mistake of law in his favor, than he would
be when retried for a mistake that did him harm. It cannot matter that the pris-
oner procures the second trial.
Id. at 134-35 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
45. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
46. Id. at 328 (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
47. Id.
1996]
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dicted the defendant for first degree murder. 48 A jury found the defend-
ant guilty of second degree murder.49 Pursuant to state law, the
prosecution appealed on the grounds that the trial court erred when it
excluded material evidence and instructed the jury as to the difference
between first and second degree murder.5" The defendant was retried,
found guilty of first degree murder 5 1 and appealed to the Supreme
Court, claiming that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment attached to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment and that his
retrial violated such protection. 2 The Court held that the Fifth Amend-
ment did not apply to the states and upheld the conviction on due process
grounds. 53 Justice Cardozo, author of the opinion, cited Kepner and spe-
cifically noted the dissenting opinions of Justices Holmes and Brown.54
He then appealed to principles of fundamental fairness, stating:
Right-minded men.., could reasonably, even if mistakenly, be-
lieve that a second trial was lawful in prosecutions subject to the
Fifth Amendment, if it was all in the same case. Even more
plainly, right-minded men could reasonably believe that in es-
pousing that conclusion they were not favoring a practice repug-
nant to the conscience of mankind.55
48. See id. at 320.
49. See id. at 320-21.
50. See id. at 321 & n.1.
51. See id. at 321. The defendant was sentenced to death. See id. at 321-22.
52. See id. at 322.
53. See id. at 322-23.
54. See id. The "continuing jeopardy" analysis articulated in Justice Holmes's dissent
in Kepner has gained support among critics of the efficacy of the criminal justice system.
See, e.g., Roy MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 278-82 (1959); William H.
Comley, Former Jeopardy, 35 YALE L.J. 674, 681-82 (1926); Justin Miller, Appeals by the
State in Criminal Cases, 36 YALE L.J. 486,494-96 (1927); Henry H. Dickinson, Note, Crimi-
nal Procedure-Rights of State to Appeal, 45 Ky. L.J. 628, 636 (1957); Note, Double Jeop-
ardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1285-86 (1964).
55. Palko, 302 U.S. at 323. Justice Cardozo further explained that:
Is that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a hardship
so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it? Does it violate those
"fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil
and political institutions"? The answer surely must be "no." What the answer
would have to be if the state were permitted after a trial free from error to try the
accused over again or to bring another case against him, we have no occasion to
consider. We deal with the statute before us and no other. The state is not at-
tempting to wear the accused out by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials.
It asks no more than this, that the case against him shall go on until there shall be
a trial free from the corrosion of substantial legal error. This is not cruelty at all,
nor even vexation in any immoderate degree. If the trial had been infected with
error adverse to the accused, there might have been review at his insistance, and
as often as necessary to purge the vicious taint. A reciprocal privilege, subject at
all times to the discretion of the presiding judge, has now been granted to the
Judicial Equity
In 1957, the Supreme Court in Green v. United States56 held that retrial
after an acquittal violates the rule against double jeopardy.5 7 In Green, a
case very similar to Ball, the defendant was charged with arson and first
degree murder.58 After the jury convicted the defendant of arson and
second degree murder, he obtained a reversal on appeal.5 9 The defend-
ant was tried again, under the original indictment, for first degree mur-
der;6" this second time, the defendant was convicted of arson and first
degree murder.61 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defend-
ant's original acquittal of first degree murder at his first trial barred suc-
cessive prosecution on that charge.62 The Court rejected the
government's assertion that the appeal and reversal exposed the defend-
ant to retrial on all of the original charges.63 Writing for the majority,
Justice Black emphasized the danger to a criminal defendant where the
government is permitted to make repeated attempts at conviction. 64
Four Justices dissented, 65 however, questioning the majority's interpre-
tation of the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and citing a strong
societal interest in a fair criminal justice system. 66 The dissent found that
state. There is here no seismic innovation. The edifice of justice stands, its sym-
metry, to many, greater than before.
Id. at 328 (citations omitted).
In 1969, Palko was overruled on other grounds in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969). The Court in Benton held that the Fifth Amendment applies to the States through
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 787.
56. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
57. See id. at 198.
58. See id. at 185. For a detailed discussion of Ball v. United States, see supra notes 23-
31 and accompanying text.
59. See Green, 355 U.S. at 186.
60. See id.
61. See id. Based upon his conviction, Green received a mandatory penalty of death.
See id.
62. See id. at 198.
63. See id. at 191.
64. See id. at 187-88. Justice Black's reasoning has become the cornerstone of all sub-
sequent decisions defining the scope of double jeopardy protection:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and com-
pelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as en-
hancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Id.
65. Justice Frankfurter authored the dissent which Justices Burton, Clark, and Harlan
joined. See id. at 198 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 216-19. Specifically, Justice Frankfurter asserted, "Such an approach
misconceives the purposes of the double jeopardy provision, and without warrant from the
Constitution makes an absolute of the interests of the accused in disregard of the interests
of society." Id. at 216.
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the defendant could be retried on the original charges because both
the defendant and the prosecution were entitled to an error-free
proceeding.67
In United States v. Wilson,68 the Supreme Court directly addressed the
boundaries of the prosecution's right to appeal in criminal cases.
Although the Court found that the appeal in that case was permissible, it
rejected granting the prosecution "broad" appellate rights.69 In Wilson,
the defendant was convicted of several federal charges arising out of the
misuse of union funds.7" The conviction was set aside by the district court
and the indictment dismissed due to unreasonable preindictment delay.7'
The government appealed the district court's post-conviction dismissal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which held that
the Double Jeopardy Clause barred review. 72 After granting certiorari,73
however, the Supreme Court ruled that the appeal was permissible be-
cause the district court's action was not an acquittal.74
The Court found that the Double Jeopardy Clause did not impose any
general ban on appeals by the prosecution where appellate review would
not result in a second trial.7 5 Because the appeal in the instant matter
would not result in such a trial, the interest underlying the double jeop-
ardy protection, to preclude the government from twice "punishing" a
defendant for a particular crime by way of successive trials or multiple
sentences, was not offended. 76 The Court reasoned, "Since reversal on
appeal would merely reinstate the jury's verdict, review of such an order
does not offend the policy against multiple prosecution. 77
The Court then rejected granting the prosecution "broad" appellate
rights after an acquittal in criminal cases because of the "policies underly-
67. See id. at 216. Justice Frankfurter explained that while the framers of the Bill of
Rights were focused on protecting defendants from "oppression" and the "callousness of
repeated prosecutions," they also were aware of the "countervailing interest in the vindica-
tion of criminal justice." Id. at 218-19.
68. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
69. See id. at 352.
70. United States v. Wilson, 357 F. Supp. 619, 619 (E.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 492
F.2d 1345 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
71. See id. at 621.
72. See United States v. Wilson, 492 F.2d 1345, 1347-48 (3d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 420 U.S.
332 (1975).
73. See United States v. Wilson, 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
74. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 352-53 (1975).
75. See id. at 342.
76. See id. at 343-45.
77. Id. at 344-45. The Court explained that "a defendant has no legitimate claim to
benefit from an error of law when that error could be corrected without subjecting him to a
second trial before a second trier of fact." Id. at 345 (footnote omitted).
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ing" the Double Jeopardy Clause.7" In particular, the Court emphasized
that rejecting such broad rights would deny the prosecutor the opportu-
nity to persuade a second trier of fact of the defendant's guilt after an
unsuccessful first attempt, it would prevent him from improving upon the
weaknesses in his original argument, and it would protect the defendant's
"legitimate interest in the finality of a verdict of acquittal. '79
United States v. Scott8 demonstrates one of the narrow grounds upon
which the government may appeal. In Scott, the defendant was indicted
for three counts of narcotics distribution."1 At the close of the evidence,
the district court dismissed two counts of the indictment based on pre-
indictment delay.8 2 The jury acquitted the defendant on the third
count.8 3 The government appealed the dismissal of the first two counts to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which dismissed
the appeal.' The government appealed the dismissal of the first count to
the Supreme Court, which found that because the dismissal did not re-
solve any factual elements of the offense charged in the defendant's
favor, it was not an acquittal.8 5 The Court held that an appeal and retrial
in such a situation would not offend the protection afforded by the
Double Jeopardy Clause.86 Justice Brennan dissented and wrote an elo-
quent opinion supporting the. strict and absolute preclusion of a govern-
ment appeal and retrial after an acquittal.87 Justice Brennan reasoned
that the "agony" of requiring the accused to undergo a retrial outweighed
the government's interest in enforcing its criminal laws.'
78. Id. at 352.
79. Id.
80. 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
81. See id. at 84.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 84, 98-99.
86. See id. at 100.
87. See id. at 103 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. See id. at 105. Justice Brennan reasoned that:
The purpose of the Clause, which the Court today fails sufficiently to appreciate,
is to protect the accused against the agony and risks attendant upon undergoing
more than one criminal trial for any single offense. A retrial increases the finan-
cial and emotional burden that any criminal trial represents for the accused, pro-
longs the period of the unresolved accusation of wrongdoing, and enhances the
risk that an innocent defendant may be convicted. Society's "'willingness to limit
the Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest
in enforcement of criminal laws"' bespeaks society's recognition of the gross un-
fairness of requiring the accused to undergo the strain and agony of more than
one trial for any single offense. Accordingly, the policies of the Double Jeopardy
Clause mandate that the Government be afforded but one complete opportunity
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C. Reasons for the Protection
The culmination of the numerous Supreme Court decisions establishes
that the Double Jeopardy Clause provides three separate protections:
89
(1) against a second prosecution for the same offense after a judgment of
acquittal;90 (2) against a second prosecution for the same offense after a
judgment of conviction;91 and (3) against multiple punishments for the
same offense. 92 A reconsideration of the absolute preclusion against judi-
cial review of an acquittal must focus precisely on the intent of the pro-
tection and ideal expressed in the Double Jeopardy Clause. A diagnosis
of the pathology underlying this absolute preclusion reveals that the ideal
has not taken a sinuous path.
The intent underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause is to guard against
possible state tyranny and abuse of the criminal process. 93 The central
goal is to deny the prosecution a potent instrument of intimidation and
oppression by denying the government the ability to freely subject a citi-
zen to a second trial for the same offense.94 This protection, however, is
not a mere grace note, and where the protection afforded by the Double
to convict an accused and that when the first proceeding terminates in a final
judgment favorable to the defendant any retrial be barred.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
Justice Brennan went on to note that, although allowing for review of acquittals fraught
with error would prevent the release of guilty defendants, such a premise was inconsistent
with double jeopardy jurisprudence. See id. at 106.
89. See generally Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 265-66 (1965) (ana-
lyzing the three rules that are "central to the double jeopardy prohibition").
90. See Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 145 (1986) ("When a successful postac-
quittal appeal by the prosecution would lead to proceedings that violate the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause, the appeal itself has no proper purpose."); Boyd v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 60, 63
(2d Cir. 1996) (indicating that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against "a second pros-
ecution for the same offense after acquittal"), cert. denied sub nom. Boyd v. Armstrong,
No. 95-9111, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 5053 at *1 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996); see also United States v.
Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977) (stating that "the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars appeal from an acquittal entered under Rule 29 [of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure]"); United States v. Mackins, 32 F.3d 134, 137 (4th Cir. 1994) ("The Double
Jeopardy Clause prevents a retrial after an acquittal, and it prevents an appeal from a
judgment of acquittal if a successful appeal would require further factual proceedings
against the defendant.").
91. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975).
92. See Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 497-
98 (1984); Montoya v. New Mexico, 55 F.3d 1496, 1498 (10th Cir. 1995). But see United
States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 68 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that the use of a prior conviction as
a predicate for sentence enhancement does not amount to multiple punishment for the
same offense), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 237 (1995).
93. See Ponsoldt, supra note 14, at 79-80 (describing governmental and prosecutorial
"overreaching" as the reason for the protection against double jeopardy).
94. See Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 568-69.
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Jeopardy Clause is not offended, an absolute preclusion is not
warranted.95
The prejudice resulting from any repeated attempt by the prosecution
to convict the accused has been viewed as being offensive to principles of
fundamental fairness in two ways. First, a retrial would subject the ac-
cused to prolonged embarrassment and expense, while imposing a contin-
uing state of anxiety and instability.96 Second, a retrial would afford the
government an unfair advantage to convict the accused by permitting the
prosecution a second opportunity to present its case, and, thereby, perfect
its trial strategy.97 Implicit in this rationale is the thought that if the gov-
ernment may reprosecute, it gains an advantage from what it learns at the
first trial about the strengths of the defendant's case and the weaknesses
of its own.98 Following this logic, repeated attempts to convict an individ-
ual for the same offense through successive prosecutions increase the
likelihood that, even though innocent, the accused eventually will be
overwhelmed by the prosecution's resources and found guilty. 99
95. See Wilson, 420 U.S. at 344; cf. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1191 (1995)
(finding that use of the exclusionary rule is unjustified where no "appreciable deterrence"
results (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)).
96. See Schiro, 510 U.S. at 229-30 (finding that protection operates to preclude re-
peated attempts to convict accused and subject "'the defendant to embarrassment, ex-
pense, anxiety, and insecurity' (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136
(1980)); cf. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) ("A power in government to
subject the individual to repeated prosecutions for the same offense would cut deeply into
the frameworks of procedural protections which the Constitution establishes for the con-
duct of a criminal trial.").
97. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 105 n.4 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. See Ponsoldt, supra note 14, at 81 ("A conceptual foundation for double jeopardy
protection is that a jury's guilt determination may be less reliable if it occurs after a second
trial, when the government has familiarized itself with the defense and marshalled its
forces through the effective creation, control, and modification of the evidence.").
99. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1984) (stating that a "bar to retrial
following acquittal or conviction ensures that the State does not make repeated attempts to
convict an individual, thereby exposing him to continued embarrassment, anxiety, and ex-
pense, while increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction or an impermissibly enhanced
sentence"); Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42-43 (1982) (finding that double jeopardy pro-
tection granted by the Fifth Amendment prohibits a second trial for the purpose of afford-
ing the prosecution another opportunity to provide evidence which it failed to present in
the first proceeding); DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 131 (holding that the state may not retry
defendant after a conviction is reversed on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence);
Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (finding central to the objectives of the prohi-
bition against successive trials is the barrier to "affording the prosecution another opportu-
nity to supply evidence which it failed to produce in the first proceeding"); Gilliam v.
Foster, 61 F.3d 1070, 1079 (4th Cir. 1995) (asserting that the double jeopardy protection
granted by the Fifth Amendment permits only a single opportunity for prosecution to pres-
ent evidence against a defendant), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1849 (1996); United States v.
Sloan, 36 F.3d 386, 403 (4th Cir. 1994) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (stating that double jeop-
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D. Erroneous Judgments
The Supreme Court has held that the prosecution is precluded from
appealing an acquittal even if it is the product of erroneous evidentiary
rulings or erroneous interpretations of governing legal principles. 100
Likewise, an acquittal that is the product of jury or witness intimidation
or tampering cannot be set aside.
In Fong Foo v. United States,101 the district court directed judgments of
acquittal before the conclusion of the government's case. 102 Although
the Supreme Court found that the district court lacked the authority to
order judgments of acquittal, the Court held that the double jeopardy
protection prohibited a retrial."0 3 The Court, relying on Ball, reasoned
that a review of the acquittal would place the defendants twice in
jeopardy. 1°4
ardy protection prohibits retrial due to the prosecution's failure to provide evidence suffi-
cient to support a conviction).
It should be noted that in civil cases, the plaintiff is free to seek judicial review and retry
his case after a judgment in favor of the defendant. Thus, the civil justice system tolerates
the increased financial and emotional burden as well as affords, in theory, the plaintiff a
more favorable opportunity to obtain a judgment in his favor in a retrial after a defense
verdict is vacated or reversed. Moreover, a wrongful death civil suit may be brought
against a defendant after he is acquitted in a criminal trial. For example, although O.J.
Simpson was acquitted of the killings of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman, the
families of the victims filed wrongful death suits against him. See Complaint for Damages-
Survival Action (No. SC 36876), available in LEXIS, Hottop Library, EXTRA File; Com-
plaint for damages for Wrongful Death (No. SC 36340), available in LEXIS, Hottop Li-
brary, EXTRA File.
100. Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 75 (1978) (holding that acquittal based on
insufficient evidence bars reprosecution even if the insufficiency resulted from the trial
court's erroneous exclusion of evidence that might establish guilt); Arizona v. Washington,
434 U.S. 497, 503 (1978) ("The public interest in the finality of criminal judgments is so
strong that an acquitted defendant may not be retried even though 'the acquittal was based
upon an egregiously erroneous foundation."' (quoting Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S.
141, 143 (1962) (per curiam))); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (asserting
that "one of the elemental principles of our criminal law [is] that the Government cannot
secure a new trial by means of an appeal even though an acquittal may appear to be
erroneous").
101. 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (per curiam).
102. See id. at 142.
103. See id. at 143.
104. See id. The Court reaffirmed this principle in United States v. Scott:
What may seem superficially to be a disparity in the rules governing a defendant's
liability to be tried again is explainable by reference to the underlying purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. As Kepner and Fong Foo illustrate, the law attaches
particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an acquittal,
however mistaken the acquittal may have been, would present an unacceptably
high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear
down the defendant so that "'even though innocent he may be found guilty."'
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Clark argued that the district court had
neither the power to direct a verdict of acquittal nor the power to enter a
judgment thereon.1" 5 In fact, he argued that no judge has the power to
prejudge the government's proof before hearing the testimony, and then
to enter a judgment of acquittal."° Such action by the court frustrates
the government's ability to prosecute those persons who violate the
law.107 Furthermore, such action robs the public of its fundamental right
to have a person, legally indicted by a grand jury, publicly tried on the
charges. 08
III. RECONSIDERATION
A. Permitting Retrial Under Limited Circumstances and After Judicial
Review Does Not Undermine Double Jeopardy Protection
Afforded Against Government Tyranny
An accused has a legitimate and important interest in being protected
from a retrial that is motivated by the government's vindictive and preda-
tory attempt to convict him. It is readily conceded that an accused whose
acquittal is based on insufficiency of evidence, rather than plain error by
the district court, intimidation, tampering, or misconduct, cannot be re-
tried. Under these circumstances, the preclusion should not be trivialized
or traduced. The Double Jeopardy Clause should continue to preclude a
retrial after an acquittal that is the product of an error-free proceeding.
Where the remedial objectives of this protection are not offended, how-
ever, an absolute preclusion is not warranted. 0 9
Permitting a retrial under limited circumstances and after judicial re-
view would not be a troubling departure from a criminal justice system
that has traditionally ensured fair treatment to the accused. For instance,
if an acquittal is found to be the product of plain error, intimidation, tam-
pering, or misconduct, a retrial would not represent abuse by the prosecu-
tion. Under these limited circumstances, the protection afforded the
accused is not diminished for several reasons. First, the authority to per-
mit a retrial would not be left to the discretion of the prosecutor; instead,
a retrial would be permitted only after judicial review vacates or reverses
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S.
184, 188 (1957)).
105. See Fong Foo, 369 U.S. at 144 (Clark, J., dissenting).
106. See id. at 145-46.
107. See id. at 145.
108. See id.
109. Cf Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1191 (1995) (stating that the exclusionary
rule, as with any remedial device, should be applied only in those instances where its reme-
dial purposes are served).
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the adjudication. Judicial review under these circumstances would be
limited and the standard to vacate or reverse a judgment of acquittal
would be meaningful. The procedure to guarantee a fair trial would con-
tinue in any successive prosecution. Furthermore, the prosecutor's deci-
sion to seek review and retrial would be subject to a deliberative process.
Lastly, under the limited circumstances proposed here, the prejudice im-
posed upon the accused as a result of the judicial review is insubstantial.
1. Judicial Review
The principal role of an independent judiciary is to review government
action for compliance with the Constitution. A retrial motivated by the
prosecution's desire to misuse the government's resources to injure and
coerce an accused would not survive scrutiny by the courts. A retrial
would occur only after an appellate court finds that the judgment of ac-
quittal was the product of an egregious error of law by the district court,
or after a district court finds that the verdict was the product of jury in-
timidation, jury tampering or intimidation, or misconduct. Accordingly,
retrial under these limited circumstances would neither offend principles
of fundamental fairness nor represent an abuse by the prosecution.
While some of the accused's interests may be infringed upon, the protec-
tion against government tyranny would not. To require a criminal de-
fendant to stand trial again following an acquittal and an appeal reversing
his acquittal is not an act of government oppression against which the
Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to protect.
A retrial following an error-free trial and acquittal would violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. The protection against any corrupted vicissi-
tudes of the government, however, is not offended by a retrial that occurs
after a finding of plain error, jury intimidation or tampering, or miscon-
duct. Although the initial prosecution is instituted at the discretion of the
prosecution, a retrial would not be within its discretion. Instead, dispas-
sionate review by the court would act as a firewall against any abuse or
vindictiveness by the prosecution."'
2. Standard of Review
Exceptions to absolute preclusion and protection should not be found
casually. The acquittal must amount to a miscarriage of justice. This oc-
110. In addition, a second trial may be subject to a motion to dismiss on the ground of
selective prosecution. To establish a prima facie case of selective prosecution, a defendant
would need to prove: (1) that others similarly situated have not been retried; and (2) that
the second trial is based on an impermissible motive. See United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d
1424, 1432 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Williams v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1147
(1995).
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curs when the proceedings are so contaminated by error or misconduct
that the adjudication is fundamentally unfair so as to do violence to the
concept of justice. Accordingly, to retry the accused, the prosecution
would be required to show three things: (1) that the district court commit-
ted plain error, that the jury or witnesses were intimidated or tampered
with, or that there was misconduct by defense counsel; (2) that the judg-
ment of acquittal was the product of this error, intimidation, tampering or
misconduct; and (3) that absent the error or misconduct, there is a rea-
sonable likelihood that the result of the proceedings would have been
different. In essence, the prosecution would be required to prove that it
was denied a fair trial. Such error or misconduct risks an unreliable trial
outcome and impeaches the integrity of the criminal process; a retrial
would be sensible and appropriate.
The party seeking relief from a judgment of acquittal would carry the
burden of showing error, jury intimidation or tampering, or misconduct,
and materiality of the error or act.111 Materiality or prejudice must be
sufficient to risk an unreliable trial outcome.112 In the case of juror intim-
idation or tampering, the government would be required to prove that a
juror was paid or threatened to vote for an acquittal. Once the govern-
ment proves that such contact occurred, the burden would shift to the
defendant to demonstrate that the contact was harmless. 1 3 If a reason-
able probability existed that the extrinsic contact influenced the jury's de-
liberations, then a new trial would be warranted.' 14 A suggestion of
111. The standard of proof governing a motion for a new trial based on witness and jury
intimidation or tampering would be by a preponderance of the evidence.
112. See United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1359 (4th Cir. 1993) (establishing five
necessary elements for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence: (1) evidence newly
discovered; (2) facts which imply diligence on the part of the movant; (3) evidence relied
on must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) evidence must be material; and (5)
evidence would more than likely produce an acquittal), affd, 511 U.S. 485 (1994); see also
United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 1271, 1282 (5th Cir.) (finding that even if a prosecu-
tor knowingly uses perjured testimony, reversal is required only if the testimony is material
(i.e., if its use would likely have affected the outcome of the trial)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2011 (1995); United States v. Francisco, 35 F.3d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding
prosecutorial misconduct to be reversible error if the "conduct prejudicially affected the
defendant's substantial rights so as to deprive her of a fair trial"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
950 (1995).
113. See United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 550 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that prej-
udice is presumed the moment extrinsic contact with the jury is established by the
accused).
114. See id. at 554 (holding that a new trial was required because a reasonable
probability existed that the jury deliberations were tainted by extrinsic contact); United
States v. Acker, 52 F.3d 509, 516 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming a trial judge's decision to deny
defendant's motion for a new trial because the defendant failed to show that extraneous
prejudicial information was brought to the attention of a juror or that outside influence
was brought to bear on a juror), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996).
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improper contact with a juror, however, would not automatically trans-
late into a new trial.' 15 If the jury voted in favor of an acquittal, the
government would need to prove that at least one vote for an acquittal
was actually or constructively coerced or corrupted. If the government
suspected witness intimidation or tampering, it would be required to
prove that a witness gave false testimony and that this testimony was ma-
terial to the judgment of acquittal.' 6 The government would not be enti-
tled to a new trial if the false testimony related to a collateral matter.
In the case of an error of law by the district court, appeal and reversal
would lie only for plain error. The error must be obvious, affect substan-
tial rights, 1 7 and also affect "'the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings."' 118 Stated another way, the error cannot be
harmless: it must be egregious and contaminate the judgment of acquittal
so as to inflict a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict." 9
Although the protection provided by the Double Jeopardy Clause is im-
portant, it is not unreasonable to find that this right is subordinate to the
public's interest in affording the prosecution one full and fair opportunity
to present its evidence to an impartial jury.' 20
115. See, e.g., United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 321-22 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
a mere proffer without further support is insufficient to create a colorable claim of jury
tampering).
116. To demonstrate perjury, the government would be required to prove that the testi-
mony was false, concerned a material matter, and was given with the willful intent to
deceive. See United States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 646 (4th Cir. 1995).
117. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).
118. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v. Atkinson,
297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)); see also United States v. Nieto, 60 F.3d 1464, 1467 (10th Cir.
1995) (applying plain error standard as one that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the judicial process), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 793 (1996); United States
v. Vazquez, 53 F.3d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Zarnes, 33 F.3d
1454, 1474 (7th Cir. 1994) (same), cert. denied sub nom., Bland v. United States, 115 S. Ct.
2286 (1995).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 35 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
district court's failure to give a requested jury instruction seriously impaired the defend-
ant's ability to conduct his defense).
120. "[T]he public's interest in 'fair trials designed to end in just judgments' is not to be
undermined casually." United States v. Sloan, 36 F.3d 386, 404 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 516 (1978)). Furthermore, "the Double Jeopardy
Clause recognizes society's interest in 'giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to
convict those who have violated its laws."' Id. at 405 (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at
509). "[flublic justice demands that the government be given the opportunity to complete
a prosecution." Id.
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3. Fair Retrial
A second trial would not displace the phalanx of procedures that en-
sures a defendant is afforded a fair trial.12 1 The accused would continue
to receive all the protections currently in place to ensure that the pro-
ceedings are fundamentally fair. An accused's right to cross-examine wit-
nesses, challenge evidence, or call witnesses on his behalf would not be
infringed. The government would be required to prove, and the jury
would be required to find, guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 22
4. Prosecutorial Judgment
The initiation of the criminal investigation and pursuit of a criminal
prosecution represents an awesome use of government authority, requir-
ing detached and sober judgment.'23 The decision to prosecute can de-
stroy a person's life and reputation. An accused's life is held captive and
under appreciable personal and financial strain. Consequently, the public
121. Fundamental to the criminal process is that the defendant be afforded a fair trial.
As Justice Frankfurter wrote in Irvin v. Dowd:
More than one student of society has expressed the view that not the least signifi-
cant test of the quality of a civilization is its treatment of those charged with
crime, particularly with offenses which arouse the passions of a community. One
of the rightful boasts of Western civilization is that the State has the burden of
establishing guilt solely on the basis of evidence produced in court and under
circumstances assuring an accused all the safeguards of a fair procedure.
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Compare Irvin with Justice Black's opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344
(1963), which stated, "From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and
laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure
fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law."
Id.
What is advanced here for reconsideration does not alter or amend the fundamental princi-
ple that the defendant is entitled to a fair trial.
122. A corollary is that, in addition to judicial review, the jury system itself would stand
as a buffer between tyranny and the accused.
123. The present absolute preclusion brings with it the appearance of the fairness re-
garding a mechanism that operates to displace a potential abuse of the criminal process.
The criminal process, however, is intended to be one of human construction. An absolute
preclusion displaces any vindictive behaviors of prosecutors and, with it, any threat of ca-
priciousness. With this security, however, the talents and sense of justice that only individ-
uals can bring to the process is, likewise, forfeited. For example, see Rachel L. Swarns,
Prosecutor Resists Pataki Pressure on Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1996, at B1,
describing Bronx District Attorney Robert T. Johnson's refusal to be pressured into seek-
ing the death penalty by Governor George E. Pataki in connection with prosecution of
person accused of killing a New York City police officer. In a related article, Jan Hoffman
wrote that: "The philosophical foundation of any prosecutor's office is discretion-the
prosecutor's right to choose which crimes to investigate, who to charge and what sentenc-
ing deals to offer, all decisions that are based on a complex, shifting set of factors." Jan
Hoffman, Death Penalty Raises Issue of Obligation of Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1996, at 33-35.
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is served by decisions to prosecute that arise from a sense of humility,
reserve, proportion, and restraint. Although much maligned, most prose-
cutions are not driven by the vaulting ambitions of the individual prose-
cutor. Rather, decisions to prosecute are driven by a genuine connection
to the values and ideals of the criminal justice system. The decision to
seek reversal and retry a defendant would be subject to this deliberate
judgment.
In some cases, the public's interest will be better served when the pros-
ecution is terminated after an acquittal regardless of whether the pro-
ceeding was error free. On the other hand, society pays too high a price
for an acquittal when the government's ability to pursue judicial review of
plain error, intimidation, tampering, or misconduct is foreclosed. It is
within this context that the criminal process would benefit from permit-
ting the prosecution to seek judicial review to reverse a judgment of ac-
quittal that is the product of a defective judicial process.124
5. Prejudice to an Accused
Permitting judicial review does not subject an accused to such agony
and expense that permitting limited appeals would be contrary to princi-
ples of fundamental fairness. Certainly, there would be some anxiety and
expense associated with responding to a motion for a new trial or an ap-
peal. This burden, however, does not outweigh the public's right to a fair
opportunity to enforce its criminal laws. In the event of a retrial, the
burden on an accused is less compelling. Although the court could factor
in the burden on a defendant in deciding whether to set aside the acquit-
tal and order retrial, in most cases and under these limited circumstances,
requiring a defendant to defend himself in a second trial is not unduly
prejudicial when considering the benefit to the integrity of the criminal
process. This is simply because a defendant has no right to benefit from
an acquittal obtained through a judicial process that is defective in some
fundamental respect. 125
In addition, a retrial under these limited circumstances does not un-
fairly aid the prosecution. Similar to the prosecution, the defendant also
gains an advantage from what he learns at the first trial about the
strengths of the government's case and the weaknesses of his own de-
fense. A retrial would permit the defendant to rework his defense, to
124. What is unsaid is that the absolute preclusion erroneously assumes prosecutorial
oppression. This assumption is not well considered or obvious. An equal assumption is
that the prosecution operates in an environment where oppressive and vindictive prosecu-
tions are not tolerated or likely to thrive.
125. Cf. United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d 144, 151 (4th Cir.) (stating that defendant has
no right to perjured testimony), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 266 (1995).
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perfect his trial strategy, and to supply evidence that he failed to present
in the first trial. As a result, an overwhelming majority of retrials would
not result in an unfair advantage to the prosecution or undue prejudice to
the defendant.
B. The Rationale Behind the Double Jeopardy Protection Yields to
Retrials in Less Compelling Circumstances
The rationale underlying the protection against successive prosecutions
was put in place expressly to (1) avoid having an accused endure a con-
stant state of anxiety and insecurity; and (2) avoid giving the government
an unfair opportunity to convict an accused by using information ob-
tained during the first trial concerning the strengths and weaknesses of its
case. 126 The rationale behind precluding judicial review of plain error,
tampering, or misconduct is hollow, however, considering that it yields to
retrials in less compelling circumstances.
An accused is subject to the adverse effects of successive prosecution
when (1) the first trial results in a mistrial due to a hung jury and the
accused is retried; 127 (2) the first trial results in a mistrial for reasons
other than a hung jury and the defendant is retried;' 28 (3) the first trial
results in a conviction, but the defendant is retried after he obtains a re-
versal of his conviction on appeal on a ground other than sufficiency of
126. See Weston v. Kernan, 50 F.3d 633, 636 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 351
(1995).
127. A retrial following a "hung jury" does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 509 (1978); United States v. Ndane, 87 F.3d 114,
115 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Kenneth B. Noble, Menendez Brothers Guilty of Killing Their
Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1996, at A12 (examining how the defendants were convicted
of killing their parents in a second trial after the first proceeding ended in hung jury);
Richard Sandomir, After Mistrial, King Is Headed Back To Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18,
1995, at A29 (announcing prosecution's intent to retry a boxing promoter on wire fraud
charges following mistrial after the jury deadlocked at the first trial).
128. If a judge declares a mistrial over the defendant's objection or without the defend-
ant's consent, the defendant cannot be retried unless there was "manifest necessity" for the
termination of the first trial. Washington, 434 U.S. at 505; see United States v. Givens, 88
F.3d 608, 614 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that a declaration of mistrial was in error and barring
retrial); Ham v. United States, 58 F.3d 78, 82 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 513 (1995);
see also United States v. Johnson, 55 F.3d 976, 978 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining that the
government is not precluded from retrying a defendant when first trial ends on the defend-
ant's motion for a mistrial); United States v. Sammaripa, 55 F.3d 433, 434 (9th Cir. 1995)
(holding that a defendant's exercise of his peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v.
Kentucky manifested a necessity to declare a mistrial, and, therefore, subsequent prosecu-
tion of the defendant was permitted); Weston, 50 F.3d at 636 (holding that "upon declara-
tion of a mistrial, retrial will only be permitted if the defendant consented to the mistrial or
if the mistrial was caused by 'manifest necessity"' (quoting Washington, 434 U.S. at 505)).
An exception to this rule occurs when the government induces the defendant into moving
for a mistrial. See Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675-79 (1982).
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the evidence;' 29 and (4) the accused is retried in federal court after an
acquittal or conviction in the state court.' 3° In light of these exceptions,
an absolute preclusion lacks any obvious cohesion.
The government's ability to supplement its evidence and retry an ac-
cused is particularly remarkable when it retries an individual in federal
court after a state court prosecution results in an acquittal.' Under the
dual sovereignty doctrine, double jeopardy protection does not bar a de-
fendant's federal trial and conviction after a state prosection for the same
129. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit retrial following reversal of a con-
viction for trial error. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988); Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978).
The Second Circuit has relied on two points to explain the rationale behind permitting
retrial after a conviction is reversed: first, by appealing his conviction, the defendant has
waived the double jeopardy defense; and second, "the first jeopardy does not end with
conviction, but rather continues through the appeal, and if successful, the remand and re-
trial are part of the original jeopardy." Boyd v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1996)
cert. denied sub nom. Boyd v. Armstrong, No. 95-9111, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 5053, at *1 (U.S.
Oct. 7, 1996); see also United States v. Hawkins, 76 F.d 545, 553 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding
that "the prohibition of the Double Jeopardy Clause against successive prosecutions does
not preclude retrial of a defendant whose original conviction is set aside because of some
error in the proceedings leading to conviction"); United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453,
1480 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that double jeopardy does not bar reprosecution when the
conviction is reversed solely for failure to prove an element of the offense that was not
understood to be part of the crime at the time of trial); Jacob v. Clarke, 52 F.3d 178, 180
(8th Cir.) (permitting retrial after a conviction was reversed because material evidence was
erroneously admitted at trial), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 323 (1995); United States v. Cote, 51
F.3d 178, 182-83 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the reversal of a conviction based on an
incorrect jury instruction does not prevent retrial); United States v. Akpi, 26 F.3d 24, 25
(4th Cir. 1994) (holding that double jeopardy does not bar the retrial of a defendant who
has been convicted of a crime but whose conviction has been overturned on appeal due to
an error in the proceedings leading to conviction).
Only one exception to this rule has been adopted by the Supreme Court: "[R]etrial is
barred if a conviction is reversed on the ground of legally insufficient evidence because
such reversal is equivalent, for double jeopardy purposes, to a jury verdict of acquittal."
Jacob, 52 F.3d at 180 (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 131 (1980));
Burks, 437 U.S. at 16-18.
130. See United States v. McKinley, 23 F.3d 181, 184 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that federal
prosecution after a state guilty plea did not violate double jeopardy). A federal prosecu-
tion after a state court conviction is reversed on appeal on grounds barring a second trial in
the state system is also permitted. See, e.g., Amy L. Miller, Man Freed After Conviction is
Indicted in Kidnapping, THE SUN (CARROLL CouNTY), Nov. 10, 1995, at B1 (indicating
that a defendant was indicted on federal kidnapping charges after his state murder convic-
tion was dismissed on appeal).
131. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, Judge Asked to Dismiss Charges in Crown Heights Stab-
bing Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1995, at 27 (reporting that an accused was indicted by a
federal grand jury for violating the civil rights of a Hasidic scholar killed in racial violence
in Crown Heights, New York, in 1991 after the accused was acquitted on state murder
charges).
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offense.132 For example, in United States v. Koon, 33 four officers were
tried in state court in Simi Valley, California, on charges of excessive use
of force by a police officer and assault with a deadly weapon. 134 The jury
acquitted the four officers on all charges, with the exception of one count
against one of the officers on which the jury hung.131 The officers were
later indicted by a federal grand jury and charged with federal civil rights
violations based on the same conduct that was the basis of the state court
acquittal. 136 TWo of the officers were convicted as a result of this federal
prosecution. 137 On appeal, the officers argued for a reversal on the
grounds that because there was collusion between federal and state au-
thorities, the Due Process Clause precluded the subsequent prosecu-
tion. 38 More particularly, the defendants contended that the federal
government's prosecution was the product of state and federal collusion
sufficiently extensive to amount to a second prosecution by the state. The
Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's contention, holding that under the
dual sovereignty doctrine, consecutive prosecutions based on the same
underlying conduct did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 39
The court found that the federal prosecution was pursued to vindicate
the separate interests of the second sovereign and was not a pretense on
behalf of the first sovereign to prosecute. The court explained that to
establish a successful double jeopardy challenge, the defendants must
show more than mere evidence of cooperation between federal and state
authorities. Rather, the defendants were required to prove that the sub-
sequent prosecution and prosecuting entity were merely a tool for the
first, or that the proceeding was a sham done at the behest of the prior
authority. The court held that there was nothing to suggest that the fed-
eral prosecution was pretextual. The court specifically recognized that
the federal government had conducted its own investigation, weakening
the collusion argument and indicating that the federal government had
not been a tool of state authorities. Moreover, the mere fact that evi-
dence developed from the state trial was used in the federal trial did not
create a double jeopardy problem. In sum, there was "no evidence
132. See, e.g., Joseph P. Fried, Sheik and 9 Followers Guilty of a Conspiracy of Terror-
ism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1995, at 1 (convicting one of the defendants of murdering Rabbi
Meir Kahane in 1990 after his acquittal of the murder in a state trial in 1991).
133. 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994).
134. See id. at 1425.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1439.
139. See id. at 1438.
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that the federal prosecution was a 'sham' or a 'cover' for the state
prosecution".14°
C. Legitimacy Of The Criminal Justice System
The Supreme Court has ruled that there is no exception to the rule
precluding an appeal and retrial after an acquittal even if the judgment is
the product of a criminal process that is defective in some fundamental
respect.141 These rulings incorrectly view the law as a fixed rule and not a
set of values assigned to protect and foster the legitimacy of the criminal
process. The absolute preclusion of judicial review and retrial after an
acquittal is essentially grounded on value judgments made in divided
Supreme Court opinions that have stated that the legitimacy of the crimi-
nal justice system is best served by precluding review and retrial after an
acquittal. However, there are equal, if not more compelling, judgments
that support the opposite conclusion.
The byplay between Justice Brennan's dissent in Scott and the dissents
of Justice Holmes in Kepner, Justice Frankfurter in Green, and Justice
Cardozo's opinion in Palko, present the best thoughts on the two conflict-
ing views. Admittedly, the conflict has a raw edge to it. Most compelling
is that, beyond the sensible approach expressed by the narrative force of
Justice Holmes, Justice Frankfurter, and Justice Cardozo, the abiding con-
cern expressed by Justice Brennan behind the absolute preclusion is not
offended or undermined by permitting judicial review and retrial when an
acquittal is the product of plain error, jury intimidation or tampering, or
misconduct. Adjudication that is defective in some fundamental respect
undermines the public confidence in the criminal justice system. Permit-
ting limited judicial review would be a recognition of the public's interest
in enforcing its criminal laws by affording the prosecution a fair opportu-
nity to present its case, and would bolster the integrity of the criminal
140. Id. at 1439; see also Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 196 (1959) (upholding a
federal prosecution following a state conviction); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 134-39
(1959) (upholding a state prosecution following a federal acquittal); United States v.
Robinson, 42 F.3d 433, 434 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that under the dual sovereignty doc-
trine the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar defendant's federal conviction after state
conviction for same conduct); United States v. Zarnes, 33 F.3d 1454, 1470 (7th Cir. 1994)
(permitting federal prosecution of the defendant after he was acquitted of state charges
based on same conduct), cert. denied sub nom. Bland v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2286
(1995). But see United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Automotive Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 493-
99 (2d Cir. 1995) (questioning the continued validity of the dual sovereignty doctrine).
141. See Deborah L. Schmitt, Supreme Court Review, Fifth Amendment - Twice Jeop-
ardizing the Rights of the Accused: The Supreme Court's Tibbs and Kennedy Decisions, 73
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1474, 1489 (1982) (regarding prosecutorial misconduct as a
fundamental defect).
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process by assuring that trials are fundamentally fair to both participants
in the adversarial system of the criminal process.142
The legitimacy of the federal criminal justice system is based on public
confidence in its fairness and integrity. A judgment of acquittal that calls
into question the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of the criminal
process is needlessly tolerated. 43 Plain error of law by the trial court,
witness and jury intimidation or tampering, and defense counsel miscon-
duct, are acts and events of such grave dimension that adjudications pro-
duced by these acts and events inflict an injurious effect on the criminal
process. Consequently, permitting these results to stand fosters a de-
crease in public confidence in the criminal process. In this context, per-
mitting judicial review would not carve out a harmful exception. Rather,
it would send the signal that the criminal process will not tolerate tainted
adjudications. This message would bolster the public confidence in the
legitimacy and integrity of the criminal process by assuring that rules are
consistent and trials are fundamentally fair.
The courts have recognized society's interest in giving the prosecution
one complete and fair opportunity to convict those who have violated its
laws. 144 In essence, the prosecution is entitled to a fair trial. Public jus-
tice should not be forsaken by a rigid and inflexible rule. The interest of
the public in seeing a criminal prosecution proceed to verdict in an error-
free proceeding is intertwined with the quest for truth. These interests
become fundamentally flawed if the defendant is acquitted as a result of a
judicial process that is defective in some fundamental respect.
142. See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 362 (1957) ("Error in the course of a
prosecution resulting [in] conviction calls for the correction of the error, not the release of
the accused.") Likewise, an error in the course of the prosecution resulting in acquittal
calls for the correction of the error, not the release of the accused.
143. See Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney
King, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1995). Amar and Marcus state:
Disregarding a tainted acquittal would not be wholly illogical or unprecedented.
In many state courts, acting under double jeopardy clauses in state constitutions
or analogous common-law principles, it seems that a judgment of acquittal pro-
cured by an accused by fraud or collusion is a nullity and does not put the defend-
ant in jeopardy. Consequently, it does not bar a second trial for the same offence.
This proposition is supported by various distinguished treatises, and even appears
in Corpus Juris Secundum as a rule of hornbook law. And the proposition has
considerable common sense to commend it.
Id. at 54-55 (footnotes omitted).
144. Double jeopardy protection is sometimes held inferior to the public's interest in
providing the prosecution a meaningful opportunity to present its case. See United States
v. Sammaripa, 55 F.3d 433, 434 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sloan, 36 F.3d 386, 405 (4th
Cir. 1994); cf Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978) (requiring the prosecution
to demonstrate a "manifest necessity" to establish grounds for a retrial).
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Furthermore, the public has an interest in establishing and maintaining
a system of public justice that is structured to achieve fair trials designed
to end in respectable judgments. Public confidence in the integrity of the
criminal justice system is essential for preserving the legitimacy of the
criminal process.1 45 Legitimacy is not achieved by a one-dimensional
criminal process that tolerates plain error in favor of the defendant, jury
and witness intimidation or tampering, or misconduct by defense counsel.
The integrity of the criminal process is furthered by having a process that
is symmetrical and balanced, that affords both an accused and the prose-
cution a fair opportunity to present their cases, as well as judicial review
of a proceeding that is infected with error.' 46 Permitting review of a judg-
ment of acquittal that is the product of plain error, intimidation, tamper-
ing, or misconduct, fosters symmetry, consistency, predictability, and
balance in the federal criminal process. This symmetry cannot be
achieved without conducting the criminal process in a manner that af-
fords the right to an error-free proceeding to the prosecution in a credible
manner.
147
The defendant is afforded the right to a fair trial and the right to judi-
cial review to ensure an error-free proceeding. The prosecution should
also be afforded both a fair opportunity to present its case to the jury and
the right to an error-free proceeding.1 48 The comparison is not dispro-
145. The proposition is a simple one. The first responsibility of a democratic govern-
ment is to protect its citizens. This responsibility is frustrated by a criminal process that
overly tolerates adjudications obtained through a judicial process that is defective in some
fundamental respect. As confidence in the system of justice is depleted, the public be-
comes estranged and disengaged from the criminal process.
146. See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934). As Justice Cardozo
explained:
The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with
crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to de-
fend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial
that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate
and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But
justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of
fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the
balance true.
Id.
147. As Judge Hand wrote: "The protection of the individual from oppression and
abuse by the police and other enforcing officers is indeed a major interest in a free society;
but so is the effective prosecution of crime, an interest which at times seems to be forgot-
ten." In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 465 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting in part).
148. See Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 231-32 (1994); Gilliam v. Foster, 61 F.3d 1070,
1085 (4th Cir. 1995) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (citing Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458,
463 (1973)) (reasoning that public has an interest, firmly rooted in double jeopardy juris-
prudence in obtaining a complete prosecution of a criminal default to judgment), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 1849 (1996). In United States v. Akpi, 26 F.3d 24, 25 (4th Cir. 1994), Judge
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portionate. When the trial is infected by plain error, intimidation, tam-
pering, or misconduct that produces a judgment of acquittal, the
government should be permitted to seek the setting aside of that judg-
ment. This would be consistent with the way that courts have long
treated fundamental defects in the criminal process. The current rule is
inconsistent and immunizes a defendant from punishment when his ac-
quittal is the product of plain error, intimidation, tampering, or miscon-
duct. This exacts too high a price from the efficient and credible
administration of justice.' 49 The criminal justice system simply cannot af-
ford to deny the public a fair opportunity to enforce its criminal laws
because of an inflexible and rigid process.' 50
Balancing the criminal process by affording the prosecution the right to
limited judicial review and retrial would further the administration of jus-
tice in three fundamental ways.' 5' First, an appeal after an acquittal
would be a credible deterrence against witness and jury intimidation and
tampering. Unfortunately, with the rise of urban violence and narco-cor-
Niemeyer set forth the rationale for permitting a retrial after a defendant obtains a reversal
of his conviction due to an error in the proceedings:
A rule that would immunize a defendant from punishment when his trial con-
tained any error sufficient to require a reversal would exact too high a price from
law enforcement efforts because the complexity of courtroom procedure must in-
evitably lead to some errors, even when attorneys and judges are at their best.
Our criminal justice system simply cannot afford to let guilty defendants walk free
because of the criminal procedure's complexity, particularly when the complexity
is attributable to efforts to protect the innocent and to convict only the guilty ...
In short, retrial after reversal due to trial error is not an abuse that was intended
to be prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Id. (citation omitted). This rationale also supports retrial after an acquittal is reversed on
the limited grounds advocated here.
149. See O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 997 (1995) (explaining that in a habeas
proceeding, plain error risks an unreliable trial outcome and calls into question the integ-
rity of the criminal process).
150. An alternative is an appeal during the trial proceeding and prior to a verdict. See,
e.g., David Margolick, California Court Overturns Ruling In Simpson Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 1995, at 1 (reporting an appeals court's overturning of a trial court's intended jury
instruction). Because appeals of right have been authorized, however, there has been a
firm policy against interlocutory or "piecemeal" appeals, and courts have consistently
given effect to that policy. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651,657-58 (1977) (finding
intermediate appeals disruptive to the criminal process).
151. The Supreme Court has recognized the benefit of symmetry in the criminal process
in its commitment to establishing a criminal procedure where jury selection procedures are
fair and nondiscriminatory to both the defendant and the prosecution. See Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 48-50 (1992) (precluding a criminal defendant from engaging in
purposeful racial discrimination in exercise of preemptory challenge); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 96-98 (1986) (barring a prosecutor's discriminatory use of preemptory chal-
lenges). In McCollum, the Court extended the rule in Batson to the defendant because it
found that a discriminatory jury selection procedure in favor of the defendant undermines
the public confidence in the criminal process. See McCollum, 505 U.S. at 49.
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ruption, the stain of witness intimidation is increasingly making its im-
pression upon the criminal justice system.152 By permitting judicial
review, the defendant would no longer benefit from an acquittal obtained
through these corrupt means. The threat of having an acquittal reversed
as a result of jury or witness intimidation or tampering should be an acute
deterrence to any misconduct.
Second, an appeal after an acquittal would be a potent deterrent
against any misconduct by defense counsel. It is common practice in a
criminal trial for defense counsel to press every advantage. Unfortu-
nately, this is used as a license for impermissible remarks and conduct.
Permitting appellate review of defense counsel's conduct would create a
credible deterrence and a shared culture that would subject him to the
same standards that apply to the prosecutor. This may moderate the sys-
tem and lessen the incentive to act ruthlessly in pressing every advantage.
In sum, permitting judicial review would create a balanced disincentive
that should encourage both the prosecutor and defense counsel to be
principled participants.
Finally, rather than a potentially chilling impact, a balanced criminal
process should encourage trial courts to be more zealous in protecting
against the effects of improprieties by the prosecution. Any reluctance to
rule against the government because it would jeopardize a prosecution
would no longer be present. A district court could rule with confidence
against the government in matters, even to the point of terminating a
prosecution, without the risk of erroneously ending the prosecution. The
matter would be reviewable on appeal, and, if the trial court was errone-
ous, the prosecution would be allowed to proceed. Thus, an error by the
152. See, e.g., Randy Kennedy, He Spoke Up for Law, and Died for It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 1996, at B1 (reporting that a witness was killed after testifying before a grand jury);
N.R. Kleinfield, Prosecutors Paying Millions to Protect Cowed Witnesses, N.Y. TIMES, May
30, 1995, at Al (reporting the expenses and measures taken to protect witnesses); Selwyn
Raab, Brother of Mob Turncoat Is Gunned Down, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1995, at 14 (report-
ing the murder of a mobmember's brother after the member testified against his former
confederates); Sam Howe Verhovek, Gang Intimidation Takes Rising Toll of Court Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1994, at Al (reporting violent measures taken by gangmembers to
quiet witness testimony); Witness Intimidation Is Called a Growing Problem, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 1994, at A30 (reporting a generally increasing trend in witness intimidation).
Jury tampering is also a formidable problem. See, e.g., James C. McKinley Jr., Prison
Time for Lawyer Convicted of Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995, at B2 (reporting that a
lawyer was sentenced to eight months in jail in connection with arranging to pay a witness
$3,000 to offer false testimony in murder trial); Charles Strum, 2 Top New Jersey Crime
Figures Admit Juror Bribery in U.S. Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1993, at B1 (reporting that
two members of the Lucchese crime family in New Jersey admitted in federal court that
they bribed or tried to bribe jurors in federal racketeering trials). Jury tampering and
intimidation was also vividly detailed in Brian Gibson's film The Juror (Columbia Pictures
1996).
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trial court in favor of the defendant would not put the accused irrevoca-
bly beyond the reach of further prosecution.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the centerpiece of American jurisprudence is maintaining a legiti-
mate criminal process that results in respectable judgments. Neither the
interest in precluding tyranny by the state nor the interest in ensuring a
fair opportunity for the prosecution to present its case are to be under-
mined casually. A failure in either regard adversely affects the quest for
truth and undermines the public confidence in the integrity of the crimi-
nal process. As a consequence, innocence and guilt are relevant.
Contrary to Justice Brennan's dissent in United States v. Scott, the fact
that an acquittal results from a fundamental defect does affect the accu-
racy of that determination and does alter the essential character of the
adjudication.153 Public confidence in the criminal system is diminished
when a judgment of acquittal is the product of plain error, jury intimida-
tion or tampering, or misconduct. Thus, under limited circumstances the
criminal justice system would be best served by permitting judicial review
and retrial after an acquittal. In the extraordinary case, where the judg-
ment of acquittal calls into question the integrity of the criminal process,
the protection against double jeopardy afforded an accused should ac-
commodate the public's interest in providing the prosecution a fair op-
portunity to present its case to the jury.
The position advocated here does not seek to annul criminal laws in
order to compromise the rights of the accused. The original intent re-
mains trenchant. When the safeguards against government tyranny re-
main in place, however, it is a distortion of the intent of double jeopardy
protection to block judicial review and retrial. Judicial review and retrial,
under the limited circumstances advocated here, are not the sort of gov-
ernment oppression at which the Double Jeopardy Clause is aimed. They
merely permit the government a fair opportunity to prove its case in ac-
cordance with the applicable law.154
153. As Justice Powell stated in his dissent in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430
(1981):
Underlying the question of guilt or innocence is an objective truth: the defendant,
in fact, did or did not commit the acts constituting the crime charged. From the
time an accused is first suspected to the time the decision on guilt or innocence is
made, our criminal justice system is designed to enable the trier of fact to discover
that truth according to law.
Id. at 450 (Powell, J., dissenting).
154. See United States v. Weems, 49 F.3d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a retrial
was permitted after a reversal of conviction based on a change in the law after trial).
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The law is not routine. It may change in direction and emphasis. In
this context, it remains a prerogative of commentators on the law to
probe regions deemed to be off-limits. Unconstrained by inflexibility,
commentators have long performed the function of finding new ways to
look at established doctrine. Such exploitation is often viewed as trans-
gressive, and sometimes shocking. Because even long-entrenched dogma
is not impervious to change,155 however, these commentaries often be-
come extremely relevant. What is advanced here is a serious and sensible
innovation in criminal jurisprudence to further the legitimacy and integ-
rity of the criminal process. Contrary to the established proposition, the
absolute preclusion against judicial review and retrial after an acquittal is
not an irreversible and infallible doctrine laser printed on parchment and
requiring full assent. Moreover, judicial review and retrial under limited
circumstances is not contrary to the principles of fundamental fairness
protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The present absolute preclusion overly tolerates judgments that are ob-
tained through judicial processes that are defective in some fundamental
respect. This is a form of tyranny that takes a tangible toll on the legiti-
macy and integrity of the criminal justice process and discredits the con-
cept of fair trials. Accordingly, because an acquittal that is defective in
some fundamental respect seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or pub-
lic reputation of the judicial proceeding, the Supreme Court should inter-
pret the Double Jeopardy Clause to permit judicial review and retrial
following reversal based on plain error, intimidation, tampering, or
misconduct.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2291-92 (1996) ("The virtue of a
democratic system with a First Amendment is that it readily enables the people, over time,
to be persuaded that what they took for granted is not so, and to change their laws accord-
ingly.") (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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